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Abstract:  This paper considers the state of nuclear and 
radiological security in the UK and abroad and reports on 
the methods that could be employed by terrorists with 
radiological or nuclear material to cause destruction.   It is 
shown that despite current safeguards that problems arise 
due to materials that are unaccounted for and poor 
implementation of detection regimes in some geographical 
regions.  The prospect of a future terrorist event that 
involves nuclear or radiological materials seems likely 
despite best efforts of prevention. 
 
1.0: Introduction 
“Mass-destructive terrorism is now the greatest non-
traditional threat to international security, and of these, 
nuclear terrorism poses a real danger.  A terrorist use of a 
nuclear-yield device is the most devastating type of terrorism 
conceivable and a radiological attack is the most likely 
variety of non-conventional terrorism.” Gavin Cameron, 
(1999), Nuclear Terrorism: A Threat Assessment for the 21st 
Century. [1]. Two years after Cameron’s book was published 
an event occurred that made the subject of nuclear terrorism 
more than academic supposition. 
 
“The tragic terrorists’ attacks on the United States were a 
wake up call to us all.  We cannot be complacent.  We have 
to and will increase our efforts on all fronts – from 
combating illicit trafficking to ensuring the protection of 
nuclear materials – from nuclear instillation design to 
withstand attacks to improving how we respond to nuclear 
emergencies.” 
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, 21st 
September, 2002. [2]. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate nuclear security 
across spatial boundaries and to assess nuclear and 
radiological threats in a global context.  Events of magnitude 
highlight vulnerabilities and threats creating the need to 
reappraise models of protection and the efficacy of 
safeguards. Terrorism has been an activity on the 
geopolitical landscape for centuries.  Yet the Al-Quaedia 
attack on the World Trade Centre on 11th September 2001 
was by far the most audacious and severe act of terrorism to 
have been inflicted on the contemporary Western world. 
 
The scale of impact that terrorist acts produce may increase 
because the greater the destruction/disruption, the more 
media coverage and the greater the attention drawn to the 
ideological or political view of the terrorists.  Biological or 
chemical weapons would not convey the same prestige as a 
nuclear attack. [1]. 
 
Barnaby (2003) contends that there are 5 types of terrorist: 
• Individual terrorist (e.g. Theodore Kaczynski [The 
Unabomber])1. 
• Nationalist terrorist (e.g. IRA). 
• Political terrorist  (e.g. fascists) 
• Single-issue terrorist (e.g. animal rights) 
• Religious fundamental terrorist  (e.g. Al-Quaedia). 
[3]. 
 
Greater freedom of movement internationally (with the 
exception of the US) has as never before provided the 
conditions whereby states and sub-state actors intent on 
malicious acts have the mobility to implement such 
operations from within the confines of the victim state. 
 
2.0:  Weapons of Mass Disruption and Destruction: 
The following will evaluate how terrorists could obtain 
materials/expertise to produce a nuclear/radiological 
weapon.  Although nuclear weapons could be stolen this is 
considered to be the most problematic option from the 
terrorist viewpoint, therefore, the 5 significant potential 
threats to international security are: 
 
• Illegal trafficking of weapons grade nuclear 
material. 
• Creation and deployment of dirty bombs. 
• Sabotage and destruction of nuclear facilities. 
• Sabotage of radiological materials in transit. 
• Creation and deployment of nuclear weapons. 
 
2.1:  Trafficking of Weapons Grade Nuclear Material: 
The trafficking of weapons grade nuclear material presents a 
serious threat to international security.  Smuggling of drugs, 
precious stones and more recently human traffic has been 
increasing over recent decades.  Nuclear smuggling is 
consistent with this trend and although attempts thus far have 
                                                 
1 Former lecturer and post-doctoral researcher in the US who 
was responsible for a bombing campaign between 1978-
1995.  Central to his reasoning was the idea that modern 
society is enslaved to technology.  This theme has deep 
philosophical roots in the beliefs of eco-activists throughout 
history.  The Luddites in the early 19th century had similar 
misgivings about industrialisation and took to direct action. 
been in the main ‘amateurish’ it is likely that more 
competent smugglers will endeavour to acquire Highly 
Enriched Uranium (HEU) >20% or plutonium. (Woessner & 
Williams, 1996) [4]. Woessner & Williams (1996) assert; 
“None of the radioactive contraband that has been 
confiscated by Western authorities has been traced 
unequivocally to weapons stockpiles.  Some of the plutonium 
that smugglers try to peddle comes from smoke detectors.” 
[4].  There is evidence that smugglers have attempted to 
deceive potential rogue buyers by offering mock fissile 
material.  
 
The IAEA established an Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) 
in 1993 to record incidents of illicit trafficking.  Eighty-nine 
(64.5%) IAEA member states participate in the database. As 
of December 31, 2005, IAEA listed 827 confirmed incidents 
involving the illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, including 
weapons-usable material. [5]. 
 
Figure 1: Confirmed incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear 
materials. Source: IAEA (2006) [5]. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Incidents involving different categories of nuclear 
materials confirmed to the ITDB 1993-2005. 
Source:  IAEA (2006) [5]. 
The US General Accounting Office (GAO) in 2003 stated 
that “20 involved either HEU (>20%) or plutonium-239”. 
[6].  More than half of these incidents occurred during 1993-
95.  The remaining cases occurred during 1999-2001.  In 
addition,  IAEA (ITDB data) shows 1 further case of 
trafficking that involved 170g of HEU in Georgia (June 
2003) [5]. 
 
This trend is of serious concern because the prospect of 
undetected weapons grade nuclear material being trafficked 
across borders is beyond accurate estimation. 
 
It should be noted that IAEA member states that contribute 
to this database may not disclose all incidents.  Illegitimate 
reasons for non-disclosure may include an unwillingness to 
share sensitive details that may undermine political 
confidence with implications for external relations.  
However, there may be legitimate reasons such as reluctance 
to publicise confidential material that might undermine 
current criminal investigations. 
 
The US GAO (2003) state a number of key observations 
about 20 incidents involving weapons-grade nuclear 
material: 
• Many of the incidents involved material that came 
from countries of the former Soviet Union, 
primarily Russia. 
• Discovered nuclear material was seized primarily in 
Russia and Eastern Europe.  There appears to have 
been an increase in trafficking in weapons grade 
nuclear material through the Caucasus (Georgia), 
Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan), Greece and Turkey.  
According to IAEA, it is uncertain whether the 
increase represents more trafficking in this material 
or better detection and reporting of activities that 
may have been going on in earlier years. 
• Most of the smuggling incidents involved relatively 
small quantities of weapons-grade materials that 
were insufficient to construct a nuclear bomb.  In 
some cases, the small quantities of material 
involved may indicate that the seller was trying to 
attract a potential buyer with a ‘sample’ quantity of 
material.  In other cases, it appears doubtful that the 
traffickers had access to larger quantities of nuclear 
material. 
• The incidents do not appear to be part of an 
organised criminal or terrorist activity or 
organisation2.  
• In most of the incidents, the weapons-grade 
material was seized as a result of police 
investigation.  The material was not detected by 
                                                 
2 Incidents seem to be too ad hoc to be associated with 
organised crime.  However, this may be a view drawn from 
insufficient evidence and is therefore open to criticism. 
equipment or personnel stationed by border 
crossings.  One notable exception involved material 
detected by customs agents at a Bulgarian border 
crossing.  This incident represents one of a few 
reported instances where nuclear material was 
shielded or protected to avoid detection. [6]. 
 
Date Details of interception 
May 1992 Russia (Luch Scientific Production 
Association); 1.5 kilograms (90% HEU) was 
discovered by police investigation. 
May 1993 Lithuania; 0.1 kilogram (50% HEU) was 
discovered by police investigation. 
July 1993 Russia; 1.8 kilograms (36% HEU) 
discovered by police investigation. 
Nov 1993 Russia; 4.5 kilograms (20% HEU) 
discovered by police investigation. 
March 1994 Russia; 3.05 kilograms (90% HEU) 
discovered by police investigation. 
May 1994 Germany; 0.006 kg of plutonium-239 
discovered by police investigation. 
June 1994 Germany; 0.0008 kg (87.8% HEU) 
discovered by police investigation. 
July 1994 Germany; 0.00024 kg plutonium-239 
discovered by police investigation. 
August 
1994 
Germany; 0.4 kg of plutonium-239 
discovered by police investigation. 
December 
1994 
Czech Republic; 2.7 kg (87.7% HEU) 
discovered by police investigation. 
June 1995 Czech Republic; 0.0004 grams (87.7% HEU) 
discovered by police investigation. 
June 1995 Czech Republic; 0.017 kg (87.7% HEU) 
discovered by police investigation. 
June 1995 Russia; 1.7 kg (21% HEU) discovered by 
police investigation. 
May 1999 Bulgaria; 0.004 kg of HEU interdiction at 
border by Bulgarian customs. 
October 
1999 
Kyrgyzstan; 0.0015 kg of plutonium-239 
discovered by police investigation. 
April 2000 Georgia; 0.9 kg (30% HEU) discovered by 
combination of radiation detection 
equipment at border and police investigation. 
September 
2000 
Georgia; 0.0004 kg of plutonium-239 
discovered by police investigation. 
December 
2000 
Germany; <1 mg of plutonium-239 
discovered in a forensic test. 
January 
2001 
Greece; 0.003 kg of plutonium-239 
discovered by police investigation. 
July 2001 France; 0.005 kg (80% HEU) discovered by 
police investigation. 
June 2003 Georgia; 0.17 kg  HEU discovered by 
boarder police 
 
Table 1:  21 cases of intercepted fissile material from 
trafficking (1992-2005). 
Sources:  US GAO (2003) & IAEA (2006) [5 & 6]. 
 
 
The 21 incidents involving HEU (>20%) and plutonium-239 
referred to above are detailed chronologically above. 
 
Between 1992-2001 the US through a variety of agencies has 
spent over $86.1 million to enable over 30 countries (mostly 
the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) to defend 
against efforts to steal and smuggle fissile material. [6]. 
 
Radiation detection equipment such as hand-held detectors, 
stationary detectors at border crossings and airports, mobile 
vans with detection equipment and training have been 
provided. [6]. 
 
“While US assistance is generally helping countries combat 
the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials, 
serious problems with installing, using and maintaining 
radiation detection equipment have undermined US efforts.”  
(US GAO, 2003) [6]. 
 
Detection equipment provided for Lithuania was 
unnecessarily stored in the basement of the US embassy.  
Furthermore, it was found that few countries systematically 
report incepted contraband and therefore makes 
benchmarking and auditing of performance almost 
impossible. 
 
It is estimated that the former Soviet Union amassed 30 000 
nuclear weapons and  600 – 650 metric tons of weapons-
grade material before it collapsed.  The security of materials 
of key concern include: 
 
• Caesium-137 (neutron reflector in reactors or 
bombs). 
• Cobalt-60 (industrial and medical use but could be 
used in a ‘dirty bomb’). 
• Lithium-6 (used in thermonuclear weapons). 
• Plutonium-239 (used in nuclear weapons and 
reactor fuel). 
• Uranium-235 (used in nuclear weapons and reactor 
fuel). [6]. 
 
It is acknowledged that the most likely smuggling routes are 
those established during the reign of the former Soviet Union 
to smuggle goods in, only in this instance it is to smuggle 
goods out.  It is clear that ex-KGB and Soviet networks 
could be used for clandestine matters given Russia’s 
impoverished workforce.  Woessner and Williams (1996) 
suggest; “Some Turkish gangs appear to be engaged in the 
trade having graduated from clandestine export of 
antiquities, they treat uranium as just another commodity.” 
[4]. 
 
It is understood that nuclear trafficking is in its embryonic 
stage but the potential for more sophisticated operations to 
develop grows with each passing year. Franchetti (1997) 
reported that in Russia; “The industry is seriously and 
dangerously under-funded – 70% of security devices at 
Russian facilities are outdated…Some of the staff working at 
these plants are desperately depressed and haven’t been paid 
in months – and the temptation to smuggle nuclear material 
out is great.  The situation is very serious.” [7]. 
 
Difficulties arise where practical matters of implementing 
policies are inhibited by corruption.  In 1998, 1500 Russian 
customs officials were dismissed for corruption. [1]. 
Moreover, the expanse of territory that borders Russia is 
immense and in some places treacherous.  Border security is 
difficult and would be prone to opportunistic trafficking.  
Where borders lie in areas of hostile natural terrain, patrols 
and detection equipment act as a deterrent rather than as a 
solution. 
 
Potter (1992) estimated that in the former Soviet Union there 
are between 1000-2000 individuals who have detailed 
knowledge concerning nuclear weapons design and between 
3000-5000 who have experience of producing plutonium-
239 and HEU. [8].  More recent estimates have not been 
found.  
 
In November 1993, HEU was stolen from the Sevmorput 
shipyard near Murmansk, Russia.  The material was 
recovered but the Investigation Officer, Mikhail Kulik 
asserted; “Even potatoes are probably much better guarded 
today than radioactive materials.” [4]. 
 
The terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo who were responsible for 
the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo underground in 1995 have 
attempted to influence Russian scientists and research 
students through donating to leading facilities.  It was further 
found that members of this cult had infiltrated the I. V. 
Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy and the Mendeleyev 
Chemical Institute. [1]. 
 
On the issue of ‘rogue states’ or sub-state actors recruiting 
Russian expertise, Cameron suggests; “…the majority of 
scientists that are moving are doing so to states that already 
possess a nuclear capability, such as Israel or China, and are 
intent on upgrading the quality of that capability.” [1]. 
 
Furthermore, Aum Shinrikyo in 1993 attempted to meet with 
the Russian Minister of Nuclear Energy but this request was 
denied.  After this rejection the cult attempted to arrange the 
purchase of natural uranium from Australia without success.  
[1]. 
 
It is for these reasons that the US has offered assistance to 
the states of the former Soviet Union through funding, 
equipment and expertise.  At the core of this assistance is 
that it is better that fissile material is stored safely and 
accounted for in situ and that stolen fissile material is 
intercepted at national borders to prevent international 
trafficking.  The US GAO (2003) refer to this as the ‘first-
line and second-line of defence’ respectively and financial 
aid is directed towards meeting those two objectives. [6]. 
 
The prospect of a ‘sub-state actor’ moving components of a 
nuclear device to a target location and assembling a weapon 
in situ must not be overlooked.  Detecting HEU is difficult if 
well shielded due to the low energy γ-rays emitted that 
cannot penetrate 2cm of lead and therefore escape the 
detection of scintillation monitoring equipment3.  Plutonium-
239 is more difficult to handle than HEU and has a 
pronounced signature, thus it would be more difficult to 
smuggle. 
 
In addition, with regard to international action on potential 
nuclear terrorism threats the Pugwash Council (2003) 
reports; “…for too long there was too little concrete action 
by national governments and the international community to 
prevent such a catastrophe from occurring.  In recent months, 
this has begun to change, most notably with the decision in 
June 2002 by the G8 countries to spend $20 billion over 10 
years to eliminate large quantities of fissile material in 
Russia.” [10]. 
 
This will involve the US pledging $10 billion and the 
remaining $10 billion matching this is to be pledged by the 
other G7 countries.  Concerns must be raised as to whether 
this timescale (10 years) is too long.  Historically the US has 
been pragmatic on this policy through pioneering the Co-
operative Threat Reduction Programme (Nunn-Lugar 
agreement) initiated in November 1991.   Its purpose is as 
follows: 
• Fund states of the former Soviet Union to dismantle 
and destroy weapons of mass destruction. 
• Strengthen the security of nuclear weapons and 
fissile materials in connection with dismantlement. 
• Prevent proliferation and to enable demilitarisation 
of the industrial and scientific infrastructure that 
could support the production of weapons of mass 
destruction. [10]. 
 
Estimated global stocks of nuclear weapons and materials 
are displayed below: 
                                                 
3 Problems arise at ports where scintillation monitoring 
equipment cannot distinguish between containers that hold 
plutonium-239 or containers that hold bananas that contain 
potassium-40. [9]. 
 
 
Table 2:  Estimated global stocks of nuclear weapons and 
material. 
Source:  POST (2002) [11]. 
 
There is huge scope for de-enrichment of Russian fissile 
material.  An agreement between Russia and the US was 
reached in 1993.  This complemented the Nunn –Lugar Co-
operative Threat Reduction Agreement (1991) and required 
Russia to de-enrich 500 metric tons and sell this material to 
the US for civil reactors. 
 
US commercial and political interests hampered the progress 
of this arrangement by increasing the timescale over a 20 
year period, so as not to flood the international commercial 
uranium market resulting in the deflation of global uranium 
prices. 
 
The Pugwash Council (2003) states; “….almost ten years 
after the original agreement, the material transferred to the 
US corresponds to less than 150 tons of Russian HEU (less 
than 30% of the target amount of 500 tons, and only 10-20% 
of all the HEU in the former Soviet Union).” [10]. 
 
2.2:  Dirty Bombs: 
The U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2003) asserts; “A 
‘dirty bomb’ or radiological dispersal device (RDD) is a 
conventional explosive or bomb containing radioactivity.  
The conventional bomb is used as a means to spread 
radioactive contamination….any type of material could be 
used in a dirty bomb, but in general this would be unlikely to 
cause serious health effects beyond those caused by the 
detonation of conventional explosives.” [12]. 
 
The major threat of such a device is the impact of the 
explosion rather than the ensuing radiological contamination.  
Air dispersal would produce relatively low levels of 
radioactive contamination and consequently low doses to the 
unfortunates exposed.  Clearly, those in the vicinity of such 
an exposure would attempt to move away from the epicentre 
of the explosion and in so doing reduce the likelihood of 
prolonged harmful exposure. 
 
The detonation of a RDD in a contained environment (e.g. 
London Underground) could present greater numbers of 
casualties depending on the date and time of detonation.  
Emergency response teams would need to act quickly to 
minimise the radiation dose received by casualties.  It should 
be noted that this scenario did not occur on the 7th July 2005 
attacks in the London Underground but this does not mean 
that it could not happen in the future. 
 
Contaminated areas would need to be cleaned up and this 
would be costly and time consuming.  Dependent upon the 
time and site of the explosion it is difficult to estimate the 
potential economic disruption that would be caused by such 
an act. 
 
Sources of radiological material that could be used in a ‘dirty 
bomb’ could derive from waste by-products from a nuclear 
reactor or medical waste. ‘Orphan sources’4 could be used 
that have become lost from regulatory control and 
management. 
 
The Center for Defense Information (2001) raise concerns 
about Russia’s security of nuclear waste.  In 1996 Chechen 
rebels planted a ‘dirty bomb’ in Moscow’s Izmailovo Park. 
The bomb was disengaged before detonation.  It consisted of 
dynamite and caesium–137. [13]. 
 
2.3:  Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities:  
“…..nuclear facilities and materials….must be protected 
from mass-consequence sabotage.  Securing these facilities 
and materials must be a top priority on the international 
agenda – something that must be pursued at every 
opportunity, at every level of authority, until the job is 
done”. (Bunn & Bunn, 2002) [14]. 
 
Had one of the hijacked aircraft involved on the 11th 
September 2001 crashed into a nuclear power station, spent 
fuel pond, or reprocessing facility the results could have 
                                                 
4 These are radioactive/nuclear materials that have bee 
abandoned, lost or stolen and are outside of regulatory 
control. 
been catastrophic.  If such an assault were carried out two 
potential scenarios emerge: 
• Meltdown of the reactor core. 
• Extensive dispersal of waste fuel on-site and 
potentially off-site. 
 
Either scenario would result in extensive casualties and 
within the terms of analysis, nuclear sites act as in situ 
nuclear devices awaiting detonation.  This scenario was 
envisioned by Ramberg  (1984) in: Nuclear Power Plants as 
Weapons for the Enemy: An Unrecognised Military Threat.  
At the time Ramberg’s view was dismissed as alarmist but 
times have changed. [15]. 
 
Nuclear power plants in most countries are designed with 
containment vessels several feet thick5.  In addition, security 
includes armed guards and safety systems.  Insider sabotage 
in co-operation with a well-armed terrorist cell would 
present a significant challenge to the most robust security 
systems.  Moreover, the potential vulnerability of critical 
safety systems to truck bombs detonated outside the 
protected area of a power plant has been widely postulated in 
the literature.   
 
Russia possesses nuclear power plants that are based on 
early Soviet design and do not have “….western-style 
containment vessels or the same level of redundant safety 
systems”. (Bunn & Bunn, 2002) [14]. 
 
Research reactors are at risk from an attack but the 
consequences would be minor in comparison to a power 
reactor due to meagre inventories.  There are research 
reactors located across the world and many contain weapons 
grade fissile material that is poorly secured. 
 
Moreover, sabotage of a spent fuel pool resulting in a loss of 
cooling water could lead to a temperature in excess of 9000C.  
A zirconium fire ensuing could disperse radio-nuclides 
including; caesium-137, into the atmosphere. 
 
A Design Based Threat (DBT) document (classified) is 
drawn-up by the Office for Civil Nuclear Security (OCNS) 
for all UK civil nuclear sites.  The resilience of sites to attack 
is further advanced through the UK Nuclear Industries 
Security Regulations that provide for the strengthening of 
security regimes.  
 
The application of ‘strength in depth’ is further manifest by 
the UKAEA Constabulary.  On-site armed police protect 
Sellafield and Dounreay.  This facility is not extended to 
other sites. [16]. 
 
                                                 
5 Nuclear power plants without containment structures 
include: RBMK (Soviet reactors), VVER-series (Soviet 
reactor) and MAGNOX (UK reactors). [16] 
Edwards (2004) warns that in the UK “Evidence is emerging 
that the no-fly zones around nuclear plants are regularly 
breached by both military and civilian aircraft.”  No-fly 
zones around nuclear facilities have a radius 3.7km.  “Over 
the last five years, the operators of 19 nuclear sites around 
Britain have lodged more than 100 complaints about aircraft 
flying too close.” [17].  The Author considers that a no-fly 
zone of 3.7km is insufficient to enable a military response to 
an aircraft enclosing upon/targeting a nuclear power plant. 
 
In the UK; “Measures [post 11th September 2001] have been 
taken to enable intervention by RAF interceptor aircraft in 
the event of an aircraft attack at a civil nuclear facility.” [11]. 
 
France installed anti-aircraft missiles around the Cap de la 
Hague facility in immediate response to the events of 11th 
September 2001 but has since removed these defences.  This 
is due to a perceived reduction in risk. 
 
2.4:  Sabotage of Radiological Material in Transit:  
“Under UK regulations (based on IAEA recommendations) 
highly radioactive material is transported in robust flasks that 
would be difficult for terrorists to rupture.” (POST, 2002) 
[11]. 
 
In the UK, the OCNS regulates the transportation of 
radiological material as arranged by civil nuclear authorities.  
The OCNS operates under the Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material for shipments sent and 
received. 
 
Ships carrying radiological material (e.g. MOX fuel) have 
“...deck-mounted naval guns and an armed escort provided 
by the UKAEA Constabulary”. [18]. Moreover, air, train and 
road transportation of radiological materials are packaged to 
withstand accidents according to the radiological hazard 
presented.  Three categories are used: 
• Type A – survives a minor impact. 
• Type B – survives a major impact. 
• Type C – survives an air accident. 
 
There are no UK reports of deliberate sabotage of 
radiological material in transit.  The increased potential 
threat of sabotage has been acknowledged throughout the 
global nuclear community and revision of the Convention on 
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was announced 
on 8th July 2005 by the IAEA [19].  Amendments include:  
improved protection measures for international 
transportation of nuclear materials and provides clarification 
on the definition of nuclear facilities and sabotage and 
appropriate levels of domestic protection. 
 
2.5:  Development of Nuclear Weapons: 
 2.5.1:  Fission Devices: 
Natural uranium contains approximately 98.28% uranium-
238, 0.7% uranium-235 and 0.0058% uranium-234.  Energy 
production is based on the fission of uranium-235, whereas 
uranium-238 must be transmuted through neutron capture to 
form the fissile product plutonium-239.  Uranium-238 is 
regarded as a fertile material. 
 
The prospect of rogue states or sub-state actors acquiring 
weapons grade fissile material (Highly Enriched Uranium – 
HEU >20% or plutonium) is of huge international concern. 
U-235 and Pu-239 in sufficient quantities can be used to 
produce weapons of mass destruction. 
 
The Federation of American Scientists (2001) assert; ”The 
minimum mass of fissile material that can sustain a nuclear 
chain reaction is called a critical mass and depends on the 
density, shape and type of fissile material, as well as the 
effectiveness of any surrounding material (called a reflector 
or tamper) at reflecting neutrons back into the fissioning 
mass.” [20]. 
 
 Uranium-235 Plutonium-239 
Bare sphere 56 kg 11 kg 
Thick tamper 15 kg 5 kg 
 
Table 3:  Critical masses in spherical geometry for weapon-
grade materials.  
Source: FAS (2001) [20]. 
 
Uncertainty remains as to the minimum amount of 
plutonium-239 required to make a bomb.  The implosion 
technique functions on the principle that the critical mass of 
compressed fissile material decreases as the inverse square 
of the density achieved.   
 
Therefore, due to the decrease of the critical mass of the 
material as density of the material increases, it follows that 
‘Implosion’ devices require limited amounts of fissile 
material compared to other types of fission weapons. 
Estimates between 8kg – 11kg have been espoused in the 
literature surveyed. 
The implosion principle is illustrated below: 
 
Fig.3:  Implosion assembly principle.    
Source: FAS (2001) [20]. 
 
From the point of view of construction the ‘Gun’ device 
would be the easiest to assemble.  Two sub-critical masses 
are used in this device.  One acts as a projectile and the other 
as a target.  A propellant crashes these two sub-critical 
masses together to form a supercritical mass.  Whereas 
plutonium-239 and HEU can be used in the ‘implosion’ 
design, only HEU can be used in the ‘Gun’ design. 
 
The generic construction of a ‘Gun’ assembly is shown 
below: 
 
Fig.4:  Gun assembly principle.   
Source: FAS (2001)[20]. 
 
Techniques exist to enhance the radiation yield of a fission 
weapon and deuterium with tritium can be employed by 
means of fusion to generate increases in high-energy 
neutrons that encourage the fission process to increase its 
yield and decrease the overall size and weight of the weapon. 
 
The Pugwash Council (2003) advanced; “HEU poses the 
danger that it is far easier to manufacture into nuclear 
weapons than is plutonium.” [10].  Moreover, the open 
literature detailing how to construct a nuclear device is easily 
available, so that a technically competent team (e.g. non-
state actor) with sufficient financial and technical resources 
could feasibly construct a nuclear weapon. (Allison, 2004) 
[21]. 
 
2.5.2:  Fusion Devices: 
Fusion (thermonuclear) devices utilise heavy isotopes of 
hydrogen (deuterium and tritium) to generate neutrons.  
When fused, intense heat and pressure is generated enabling 
the concomitant explosion to overcome the Coulomb barrier.   
 
Thermonuclear weapons utilise the properties of lithium-6 
deuteride (6LiD, σa = 70.5 barns at thermal energies – 
2.2km/s) as a means of liberating tritium.  Deuterium and 
tritium fuse creating alpha particles whose charge and high 
temperature assist in producing fire. 
 
 
 
6Li + n = 3H + 4He + Energy 
(breaking down lithium to liberate tritium) 
(Equation 1) 
 
2H + 3H = 4He + n + 17.6MeV 
(fusion reaction that causes ignition and liberates energy) 
(Equation 2) 
 
Lithium-6 is a controlled material and requires technical 
experience and knowledge due to its complex two-stage 
design.  Moreover, lithium-6 is produced by the COLEX 
(column exchange) electrochemical process and few 
countries have the capability of making sufficient for large 
quantities of weapons. [20]. 
 
Deuterium (2H) is necessary for the production of lithium-6 
deuteride and is therefore subject to export controls.  Heavy 
water (D2O) is of relevance to issues of proliferation as it can 
be used in the production of weapons grade plutonium.  
Large-scale production of heavy water requires competent 
scientists and technical infrastructure because deuterium is 
0.015% of the hydrogen in water and this percentage needs 
to be enriched to more than 99%. [20]. 
 
3.0:  Preparedness and Emergency Response: 
The IAEA dictum; prevent, detect and respond to nuclear 
threats has been clearly communicated to the international 
community and member states.  Increased levels of 
preparedness are in evidence in the UK.  
 
In the summer of 2004 the British Government sent-out the 
public information booklet: “Preparing for Emergencies: 
What You Need to Know”.  This was supported with 
television broadcasts. Advice was provided about how to 
prepare for an emergency such as a biological, chemical or 
radiological attack and helping to prevent a terrorist attack.  
MI5 produced further advice on their website. [22]. 
 
The British Government published the Civil Contingencies 
Act (2004) [23] to improve civil protection.  In addition, 
legislation has been consolidated in response to the 11th 
September 2001 attacks.  The Terrorism Act 2000 is 
extended through the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act 2001 [24]. 
 
Governments across the globe are confronting the prospect 
that their citizens may be subject to a terrorist attacks.  
Those attacks could involve radiological or nuclear 
weapons.  Not all states will be able to respond with the 
same efficiency.  Much depends upon the quality of the 
afflicted state’s infrastructure and preparedness.   
 
In the UK, contingency planning for nuclear accidents is 
well established. In the event of an accident detailed 
emergency response plans exist that extend to 15km from 
the nuclear facility. UK Parliamentary judgements will have 
to be made to decide whether emergency planning needs 
require an extension beyond that boundary.  
 
Contingency planning for a RDD or nuclear device 
detonated in an urban area is in comparison a recent 
concern.  The International Commission on Radiological 
Protection (ICRP) have drafted a report: “Protecting People 
Against Radiation Exposure in the Aftermath of a 
Radiological Attack” (2004). [25].  It is anticipated that this 
document will serve the authorities responsible for civil 
contingencies in every nation state at risk. 
 
4.0:  Outlook for Nuclear Security: 
This paper has shown that the threat of terrorism involving 
nuclear or radiological weapons is credible.  The technical 
knowledge to create nuclear or radiological weapons is 
available in the open literature.  Eliminating unauthorised 
access to fissile or radioactive waste material (for the 
construction of a RDD) is the main safeguard. 
 
However, terrorist organisations have attempted to obtain 
fissile material and trafficking remains a significant 
problem.  Increased border control and international co-
operation complemented with improved international and 
national legislative instruments will reduce the risk of an 
attack.  
 
Nations with political and economic instability or theocratic 
governance are vulnerable to poor implementation of 
improved physical protection measures. Where workforce 
morale and corruption reside (such has been the case in the 
former USSR states) there is a danger that not enough will 
be done. 
 
Opportunities for nuclear or radiological terrorism remain 
despite best efforts of protection.  An attack on a nuclear 
power station or reprocessing facility is feasible despite 
current safeguards in the UK and worldwide. 
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